Active inference and the primacy of the ‘I can’
Metzinger, Thomas (Hrsg). Philosophy and predictive processing. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group 2017 S. 74 - 91
Erscheinungsjahr: 2017
ISBN/ISSN: 978-3-95857-138-9
Publikationstyp: Buchbeitrag
Sprache: Englisch
Doi/URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566478
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Inhaltszusammenfassung
This paper deals with the question of agency and intentionality in the context of the free-energy principle. The free-energy principle is a system-theoretic framework for understanding living self-organizing systems and how they relate to their environments. I will first sketch the main philosophical positions in the literature: a rationalist Helmholtzian interpretation (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013), a cybernetic interpretation (Seth 2015) and the enactive affordance-based interpretation (Bruinebe...This paper deals with the question of agency and intentionality in the context of the free-energy principle. The free-energy principle is a system-theoretic framework for understanding living self-organizing systems and how they relate to their environments. I will first sketch the main philosophical positions in the literature: a rationalist Helmholtzian interpretation (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2013), a cybernetic interpretation (Seth 2015) and the enactive affordance-based interpretation (Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014; Bruineberg et al. forthcoming) and will then show how agency and intentionality are construed differently on these different philosophical interpretations. I will then argue that a purely Helmholtzian is limited, in that it can account only account for agency in the context of perceptual inference. The cybernetic account cannot give a full account of action, since purposiveness is accounted for only to the extent that it pertains to the control of homeostatic essential variables. I will then argue that the enactive affordance-based account attempts to provide broader account of purposive action without presupposing goals and intentions coming from outside of the theory. In the second part of the paper, I will discuss how each of these three interpretations conceives of the sense agency and intentionality in different ways.» weiterlesen» einklappen
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Klassifikation
DDC Sachgruppe:
Philosophie