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https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2010/papers/ts03e/ts03e_loehr_4666.pdf Not only in developed countries, but also in threshold and developing countries, the development process happens with a lack of control. More and more farmland is lost, and land is used in an unsustainable way. Often a legal framework exists, but compliance is poor. In order to achieve better control over land conversion, a more sophisticated planning system and more laws is not enough. ...https://www.fig.net/resources/proceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2010/papers/ts03e/ts03e_loehr_4666.pdf Not only in developed countries, but also in threshold and developing countries, the development process happens with a lack of control. More and more farmland is lost, and land is used in an unsustainable way. Often a legal framework exists, but compliance is poor. In order to achieve better control over land conversion, a more sophisticated planning system and more laws is not enough. Land owners pursue their individual goals, which do not necessarily comply with the intentions of the planners. Using the examples of Germany and Cambodia, we intend to demonstrate that – despite all differences in institutions and governance – the lack of control follows similar patterns in both developed and developing countries: The process of land use change is often actively driven by some strong and well organized beneficiaries, which try to reap a higher land rent or an incremental value. The costs of conversion is externalized to a large extent, e.g. to poorly organized groups or to society as a whole. In order to avoid the problems of such externalities, we suggest a better coupling of benefits and costs. If society bears a great deal of the costs of land conversion, it should also participate in the benefits. Specifically, certain property rights of land owners, based on land rent and land value (“ius abutendi” and “usus fructus”), should be diluted, e.g. by a suitable property tax on land. At present, (local) governments’ revenues depend heavily on land use changes. This means that local governments cannot be considered as neutral actors either. Sometimes there is also a close collusion of local governments with powerful economic interests. In order to make the local governments more neutral actors in land use policy, they should not be direct beneficiaries from land use changes. Instead, the revenues from land taxation should be integrated into a financial equalization scheme and redistributed to the municipalities (e.g. according to the number of citizens).» weiterlesen» einklappen

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DDC Sachgruppe:
Wirtschaft