Inhaltszusammenfassung

We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989-9...We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favours industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. data on tariffs, Congressional campaign contributions, and industry location in districts represented by the majority party over the period 1989-97. We find evidence of a significant majority bias in trade policy: the benefit to being represented by the majority party appears at least as large in magnitude as the benefit to lobbying.On propose une theorie de la determination de la politique commerciale qui incorpore le tendence protectionniste inherent aux systemes electoraux a scrutin majoritaire selon Grossman et Helpman (2005). La prediction qui en ressort est que, dans un tel systeme, le parti de la majorite favorise les industries localisees de facon disproportionnee dans les circonscriptions detenues par la majorite. On evalue cette prediction a l'aide des donnees sur les tarifs douaniers aux Etats-Unis, sur les contributions aux campagnes electorales au Congres, et sur la localisation des industries dans les circonscriptions representees par le parti de la majorite pour la periode 1989-97. Les resultats revelent un biais significatif dans la politique commerciale : l'avantage d'etre represente par le parti de la majorite s'avere au moins aussi important que l'avantage du lobbying. » weiterlesen» einklappen

Autoren

Klassifikation

DDC Sachgruppe:
Wirtschaft