Inhaltszusammenfassung

The German law on co-determination at the plant level (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) stipulates that works councilors are neither to be financially rewarded nor penalized for their activities. However, lavish payments to works councilors in some large firms have regenerated a debate about the need to reform the law. This paper offers an empirical basis for the discussion and provides representative evidence on wage payments to works councilors for the period 2001 to 2015. We find wage premia of ...The German law on co-determination at the plant level (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) stipulates that works councilors are neither to be financially rewarded nor penalized for their activities. However, lavish payments to works councilors in some large firms have regenerated a debate about the need to reform the law. This paper offers an empirical basis for the discussion and provides representative evidence on wage payments to works councilors for the period 2001 to 2015. We find wage premia of 3% to 7% in OLS-specifications, but observe no wage differentials in linear fixed-effects panel data specifications. We obtain similar results for various subgroups of employees and when focusing on employees in particular types of firms. Hence, our results indicate that payments to works councilors are broadly in line with legal regulations. » weiterlesen» einklappen

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Klassifikation

DFG Fachgebiet:
Wirtschaftswissenschaften

DDC Sachgruppe:
Wirtschaft